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The main goal of this manuscript is to explore the retailer conduct in the milk market in a U.S. 
Midwestern  city,  based  upon  a  structural  estimation  of  consumer  milk  demand  and  retailer 
optimality conditions. To model milk demand we rely upon the Almost Ideal Demand System, 
while allowing the retailer optimality conditions to cover a range of competitive scenarios from 
perfect competition to horizontal cartel.  We employ a conjectural variation approach in the 
spirit of Newly Empirical Industrial Organization to study the competitive environment on the 
retail landscape.  
We find that the retail market in question is far from being competitive, with the two major 
retailers  being  engaged  in  an  oligopolistic  competition.  Furthermore,  the  private  label  milk 
seems an important tool for some big players to extract rents from their competitors. 
The  current  study  offers  an  idea  of  the  competitive  atmosphere  in  the  retail  sector  of  food 
marketing system. While we do not target direct estimates of retailer market power, this might 
serve an important first step to understand the nature of competition in a given market with only 
aggregate purchase quantity and price data. 
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* Corresponding author (hovhannisyan@wisc.edu) Introduction 
Farm  level  prices  of  the  dairy  products  have  been  on  a  rise  in  the  U.  S.  until  recently, 
nevertheless their annual increments have always lagged behind the rate of increase in retail 
prices.  Meantime,  the  food  marketing  system  has  become  increasingly  concentrated  in 
downstream channels, with retailers having their share increased from 16 percent to 36 percent 
over the past three decades (U.S. Government Accountability Office). Despite potential gains 
from economies of scale, some fear that rising concentration on the retail end might come at the 
expense of final consumers and farmers as well. A recent sudden drop in farm level milk prices 
with relatively stable retail prices only provides support to the above argument. 
The main goal of this manuscript is to explore the retailer conduct in  the milk market in a 
Midwestern  city  in  the  U.S.,  using  product-level  weekly  scanner  data  from  Information 
Resources Incorporated (IRI) that spans a period from 2001 to 2006. Specifically, we estimate 
milk demand and supply relations in a structural setting using a conjectural variation approach in 
the spirit of Newly Empirical Industrial Organization. Conjectural variation parameter represents 
the collective response of the competitor firms as perceived by a firm to a unitary change in own 
quantity produced (Bowley, 1924). With proper specification these parameters allow modeling 
various oligopoly scenarios and represent the degree of competitiveness in the market (Dixit, 
1986).  
Our analysis follows a methodology proposed by Hyde and Perloff (1998). Unlike them, we 
employ an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model of demand that is less restrictive than its 
linear approximate (LA/AIDS estimated with Stone’s index for the nonlinear price aggregator)
3. 
Furthermore, the supplier optimal conditions are derived within a utility maximizing framework 
with  the  AIDS  demand  specification  underlying  consumer  price  sensitivity .  Secondly,  we 
                                                           
3 This is true, especially when correlation between prices of products in question is weak at best explore the retailer market conduct within a single industry, namely milk industry, as opposed to 
multi-industry  studies  of  market  conduct.  This  approach  may  fit  the  task  better,  given  that 
competition is of local nature for the most part. 
We find that the retail market in question is far from being competitive, with the two major 
retailers being engaged in an oligopolistic competition. Furthermore, the private label milk seems 
an  important  tool  for  some  big  players  in  their  dealings  against  major  competitors  on  the 
horizontal competitive landscape. 
The next section presents the methodology underlying this study. A brief description of the IRI 
scanner data used to study retailer market behavior is presented next. Section 4 provides the 




In this manuscript we study the market conduct of major retail chains in a Midwestern U.S. city 
using market-level data on milk disappearance over a period of six years. To do so, we use a 
structural framework where certain behavioral assumptions for the milk consumers underlie the 
milk  demand  and  supply  relationships.  In  other  terms,  demand  equations  are  derived  from 
economic theory and supply equations incorporate consumer price sensitivity to model a range of 
possible equilibria in an oligopolistic environment.  
Demand model 
An incomplete demand system for milk is modeled via Almost Ideal Demand System assuming 
milk is weakly separable from other consumables in food basket (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). 
It is derived for rational consumers with price independent, generalized logarithmic preferences (PIGLOG) and provides a first-order approximation to any demand system representing utility 
maximizing behavior.  The AIDS specification has long been a workhorse model in applied 
demand  studies  due  to  functional  flexibility  and  the  relative  ease  of  imposing  theoretical 
restrictions. The underlying indirect utility function for the AIDS model is given by: 
                              lnV= ln(m)-ln(P) b(p) (1)  
Where m is the total expenditures on products under study, ln(P) and b(p) are translog and Cobb-
Douglass price aggregator functions, respectively, specified as follows:  
n n n




ll k l=1 k=1 b(p)= p =exp β ln(p ) (3) 
With j p being the price of the th j commodity, and  i ij i ʱ ,γ ,β are parameters. Since  0 in (2) is not 
identified in empirical work, we fix it at some value as suggested by Deaton and  Muellbauer 
(1980). 
Using the indirect utility function above, we obtain the uncompensated demand functions 
(Marshallian demand) via Roy’s identity as follows: 
n
i i i ij j i j=1 q =(m / p ) ʱ + γ ln(p )+β  ln  m/P (4)  
The respective budget share equations for the AIDS demand specification are then obtained by 
multiplying both sides of (4) with a factor of i  p /m: 
n
i i ij j i j=1 s = ʱ + γ  ln(p )+β ln m / P (5)  
Where  i s  is the budget share of the  th i commodity  Respective theoretical restrictions of aggregation, homogeneity and symmetry imposed on the 






ij ij ji j=1
ʱ =1, (6)
β =0, (7)
γ =0, andγ =γ j i, (8)
 
We  calculate  uncompensated  and  expenditure  elasticity  estimates  via  respective  formulas  as 
provided in Green and Alston (1990): 
ij ij ij i i i j kj k k
i i i
ε =-δ +γ /s -β /s ʱ + γ lnp (9)
  η  = 1 + β /s (10)
 
Where  ij is the Kronecker delta 
 
Optimality conditions 
Structural estimation of demand also requires supplier optimality conditions incorporated into 
the system to be estimated. To obtain these relationships, we follow Bresnahan (1982) to equate 
effective marginal revenue to marginal cost as follows: 
  ' ii
i i i i i
i
p (q )
p + λ  q = c (q ) (11)
q
 
Here  ' () ii cq  represents  the  marginal  cost  function,  and  0, 1 i  measures  the  level  of  
competition in a  given retail market. Its value of zero implies perfect competition, while one 
signifies a retail cartel acting on a horizontal competitive landscape. Infinitely many oligopolistic 
scenarios fall somewhere in between these two extremes.  The parameter  i is also known as a 
conjectural  variation  parameter,  which  represents  a  firm’s  perception  of  its  competitive 
surrounding. Specifically, conjectural variation parameter represents the collective response of the competitor firms as perceived by a firm to a unitary change in own control variable (Bowley, 
1924). With proper specification these parameters allow modeling various oligopoly scenarios 
and represent the degree of competitiveness in the market (Dixit, 1986). 
Following  Hyde  and  Perloff  (1998),  we  assume  constant  marginal  cost  structure  given  as 
follows: 
'
i i i i i i c (q ) = a + b v +d w (12) 
Where  i v is Class I milk price (used as a proxy for the wholesale price), and w is the retail sales 
level.  
Next,  we  obtain  the  slope  of  inverse  demand  function  for  the  AIDS  model  holding  total 
expenditures and prices of related products unchanged: 
1 log (13)
j j ij i
i ij j ij i
i i i i
pp
p
q q s s  
Substitution  of  (12)  and  (13)  into  optimality  condition  (11)  yields  a  system  of  estimable 
optimality equations:  
1
i j j ij i
k i i i i i j kj k
i i i
1 ii
k i i j kj k
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λ p q γ β
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The structural model is then represented by the budget share equations (5), retailer optimality 
conditions  based  on  AIDS  specification  as  provided  by  (14),  and  theoretical  restrictions  of 




The IRI data used in this study cover market-level purchase quantities of certain milk brands and 
total dollar amount spent on them in a Midwestern city. It is a weekly dataset from 2001 through 
2006. The choice of the city is explained by the high level of retail concentration throughout the 
period under study. Specifically two major retailers account for over 50% of the total market 
share.  Particularly,  the  retailer  one  is  responsible  for  around  35  %  of  this  measure  (Market 
Scope, various years), and its average share in the dataset at hand is 26.5 %. As regards the 
manufacturers, private labels have the biggest share (over 36%) followed by the Dean Foods (2.4 
%).  
Products are defined as manufacturer-retailer combinations as shown below: 
Table 1 Products defined 
Product #       Characteristics 
 
  Manufacturer  Retailer # 
1  Dean Foods  1 
2  Dean Foods  2 
3  Johnson&Johnson  1 
4  Johnson&Johnson  2 
5  Private Label  1 
6  Private Label  2 
Note: Milk is aggregated for a given combination of 
manufacturer and retailer on a weekly basis. 
 
Since retail prices are not observed we compute the imputed unit values for six milk products 
above. Furthermore, we deflate prices from 2002 onwards using an aggregate CPI measure for 
urban areas. The IRI dataset was supplemented by data on cost components of milk production, 
specifically Class I milk price that is used in the marginal cost function (Dairy Markets Data, 
various years). Empirical results 
We employ GAUSSX module of the GAUSS software to estimate the AIDS model and its linear 
approximate. One demand equation (product # 6) was dropped due to adding up restriction. The 
parameter  estimates  for  the  omitted  equation  are  obtained  from  the  theoretical  restrictions 
imposed on the model. A total of 67 parameters are estimated, including those of conjectural 
variation (table 2)
4. Overall, the AIDS model seems to provide a  better fit than LA/AIDS. As 
regards the parameters of conjectural variation, five out of six came out significant for both 
models, and the respective measures are quite close. The average conjectural variation parameter 
estimate for retailer one is 67.3%,  while that for retailer 2 is 50.3%. Meanwhile, private label 
milk sold by retailer one turns out to have the highest estimate.  
While it is hard to interpret conjectural variation parameter estimates that lie reasonably far from 
the endpoints of a unitary interval, we get a clear idea that retail competition in this geographical 
market is far from being perfect. Anecdotal evidence supports our findings in that retailer one is 
more powerful and might be exercising more market power than its major rival.  Furthermore, 
retailer  one  seems  to  use  its  own  brands  as  a  major  competitive  tool  on  the  horizontal 
competitive landscape. 
We also present own price uncompensated and expenditure elasticity estimates (table 3).  The 
uncompensated own-price elasticity measures conform to theoretical expectations as far as sign, 
and are statistically significantly different from zero. All of them are almost unitary elastic, 
which might be explained by the availability of vast many brands of milk vying for consumers’ 
dollars. As regards the expenditure elasticity estimates, Dean Food’s milk offered by retailer one 
had the highest measure, while milk produced by Johnson & Johnson and offered at retailer two 
had an inelastic estimate. We should bear in mind, however, that this study uses aggregate data 
                                                           
4 The estimates of all other parameters not reported in the table are available upon request where  various  specialty  milk  are  combined  with  regular  milk.  Thus  one  interpretation  of  a 
finding that some milk products are inferior goods with others being normal, is that there might 
be more specialty milk (organic, lactose free, and so on) in the latter group of milk products than 
in the former one. 
The current study offers an understanding of the competitive atmosphere in the retail sector of 
food  marketing  system.  While  we  do  not  target  direct  estimates  of  retailer  market  power, 
however, this might be an important first step observing how markets operate without having 
access to rich and very detailed data. 
 
Conclusions 
The main goal of this research study is to explore the competitive environment in the U.S. food 
retailing sector. We estimate a system of consumer demand and retailer optimality conditions in 
a  structural  setting  following  a  conjectural  variation  approach  in  NEIO.  We  rely  on  AIDS 
neoclassical demand specification to model milk demand, and retailer optimality relationships 
allow for types of competition ranging from perfect competition to cartel.  
Our findings show that the retail market in question is far from being competitive, with the two 
major retailers being engaged in an oligopolistic competition. Furthermore, the private label milk 
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 Table 2 Conjectural variation parameter estimates from LA/AIDS and AIDS demand models 
  LA/AIDS    AIDS   
Parameter  Parameter 
estimate  S. E.  Parameter 
estimate  S. E. 
1   0.778  0.015  0.720  0.019 
2   0.708  0.025  0.689  0.025 
3   0.412  0.025  0.400  0.026 
4   0.370  0.049  0.316  0.051 
5   0.824  0.011  0.898  0.018 
6   0.000  0.043  0.000  0.054 
 Note: Bold identifies parameter estimates statistically significant at 0.5 % level of significance  based on a one 
tailed test. Standard errors are asymptotic estimated via delta method. 
 
Table 3 Elasticity estimates from the AIDS demand model 
 
Coefficient  S. E. 
Own-price elasticity     
Milk 1  -1.009  0.002 
Milk 2  -0.981  0.002 
Milk 3  -1.000  0.001 
Milk 4  -0.998  0.001 
Milk 5  -1.000  0.014 
Milk 6  -1.074  0.013 
Expenditure elasticity     
Milk 1  1.726  0.146 
Milk 2  1.097  0.078 
Milk 3  1.000  0.049 
Milk 4  0.771  0.051 
Milk 5  1.000  0.025 
Milk 6  0.970  0.035 
Note: Bold identifies parameter estimates statistically significant at 0.5 % level of significance  
based on a one-tailed test. Standard errors are asymptotic estimated via delta method. 
 
 
 
 